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    <title>ASPA on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in ASPA on Nalar</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>RPKI ASPA Authorizes Transit Relationships for AS_PATH Checks</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/rpki-aspa-authorizes-transit-relationships-for-as-path-checks/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/rpki-aspa-authorizes-transit-relationships-for-as-path-checks/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A valid route origin says little about the relationships represented by the rest of an AS_PATH. A prefix can originate from an authorized AS and still travel through a sequence that conflicts with expected customer-to-provider structure. Autonomous System Provider Authorization, or ASPA, adds a signed RPKI object for that second problem.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;As of September 2026, ASPA is still specified in active IETF Internet-Drafts rather than a published RFC. The current ASPA profile draft defines the signed object, while the current verification draft defines procedures for applying validated ASPA data to BGP AS_PATHs. That status matters operationally: fields and procedures remain subject to change until the specifications complete the standards process.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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