<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Asset Management on Nalar</title>
    <link>https://nalar.dev/tags/asset-management/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Asset Management on Nalar</description>
    <generator>Hugo</generator>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</lastBuildDate>
    <atom:link href="https://nalar.dev/tags/asset-management/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>Dangling DNS Records Preserve Authority After Services Disappear</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/dangling-dns-records-preserve-authority-after-services-disappear/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/dangling-dns-records-preserve-authority-after-services-disappear/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A product team deletes an old hosted application, the cloud resource disappears, and the monthly bill stops. The public hostname often survives. Months later, &lt;code&gt;preview.example.com&lt;/code&gt; still resolves through a CNAME to a provider-specific name associated with a resource that no longer exists. From the organisation&amp;rsquo;s perspective the application is gone. From DNS&amp;rsquo;s perspective, authority is still being delegated.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;That mismatch creates the conditions associated with subdomain takeover. The important detail is not simply that a DNS record points at a dead destination. Exploitation also depends on the external service allowing another party to claim the referenced name, tenant, site, bucket, project, or equivalent routing identifier. A dangling record is therefore evidence of stale control; whether it is directly exploitable depends on the provider&amp;rsquo;s ownership model.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
