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    <title>Credential Security on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Credential Security on Nalar</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 05 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Design Recovery Codes as Backup Authenticators</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/design-recovery-codes-as-backup-authenticators/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 05 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Strong authentication creates a recovery problem: what happens when the user loses the device, key, or application that normally proves who they are? If recovery is much weaker than normal sign-in, an attacker can ignore the strong authenticator and target the fallback instead. If recovery is too difficult, legitimate users can permanently lose access.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A &lt;strong&gt;recovery code&lt;/strong&gt; is a secret generated in advance and kept by the user for this failure case. It acts as a backup authenticator: possession of the code can restore access when the normal authenticator is unavailable.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Use Honeytokens to Detect Credential Misuse</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/use-honeytokens-to-detect-credential-misuse/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 05 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/use-honeytokens-to-detect-credential-misuse/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Many security alerts begin with ordinary activity: a login, an API request, or a secret being read. The difficult question is whether that activity is legitimate. A real credential may be used by several expected systems, so a single use often provides weak evidence of compromise.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A &lt;strong&gt;honeytoken&lt;/strong&gt; changes that problem by creating an identity or credential that has no legitimate operational use. If something tries to use it, the event is unusual by design and can produce a high-signal alert.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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