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    <title>CSP on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in CSP on Nalar</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Content Security Policy Makes Script Authority Explicit</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/content-security-policy-makes-script-authority-explicit/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;content-security-policy-makes-script-authority-explicit&#34;&gt;Content Security Policy Makes Script Authority Explicit&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A browser does not distinguish between JavaScript that a development team intended to ship and JavaScript that arrived through an injection flaw. Once script markup becomes part of a document and passes the browser&amp;rsquo;s normal parsing rules, it can execute with the authority of that origin. Escaping and contextual output encoding remain primary defenses against injection, but a single missed boundary can still turn untrusted text into active code.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Content Security Policy Turns Script Trust Into an Explicit Boundary</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/content-security-policy-turns-script-trust-into-an-explicit-boundary/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/content-security-policy-turns-script-trust-into-an-explicit-boundary/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A web application can escape database queries correctly, authenticate every API request, and still hand an attacker code execution in the browser through one unsafe rendering path. The browser is unusually permissive by design: HTML can load scripts from remote origins, inline blocks can execute code, and dynamic DOM operations can turn strings into active content. Content Security Policy, or CSP, gives an application a second control plane for that execution environment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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