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    <title>DDoS on Nalar</title>
    <link>https://nalar.dev/tags/ddos/</link>
    <description>Recent content in DDoS on Nalar</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>DNS Cookies Limit Off-Path DNS Amplification and Forgery</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/dns-cookies-limit-off-path-dns-amplification-and-forgery/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/dns-cookies-limit-off-path-dns-amplification-and-forgery/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;UDP makes DNS efficient, but its source address can be forged by an off-path sender. A small query carrying a victim&amp;rsquo;s address can trigger a larger response toward that victim, creating reflection and amplification. Forged replies also matter to resolvers because an attacker may try to inject an answer before the legitimate response arrives.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;DNS Cookies add a lightweight transaction token to this boundary. RFC 7873 defines the COOKIE EDNS option, while RFC 9018 updates the server-side construction so implementations can interoperate, including in multi-vendor anycast deployments. The mechanism is deliberately limited: it raises the cost of off-path forgery, but it is not encryption, DNS data authentication, or protection from an adversary that can observe traffic on path.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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