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    <title>Digital Certificates on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Digital Certificates on Nalar</description>
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      <title>Certificate Transparency Makes Public TLS Issuance Auditable</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/certificate-transparency-makes-public-tls-issuance-auditable/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;certificate-transparency-makes-public-tls-issuance-auditable&#34;&gt;Certificate Transparency Makes Public TLS Issuance Auditable&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A publicly trusted TLS certificate can be technically valid and still be a serious security problem. A certificate authority may issue for the wrong domain after an account compromise, validation failure, or operational error. The certificate can carry a valid signature, chain to a trusted root, and satisfy ordinary hostname checks. From the browser&amp;rsquo;s perspective, those properties alone do not reveal that the domain operator never expected the certificate to exist.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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