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    <title>File Integrity on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in File Integrity on Nalar</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 19 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>fs-verity Binds Read-Only File Reads to a Merkle-Tree Digest</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/fs-verity-binds-read-only-file-reads-to-a-merkle-tree-digest/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/fs-verity-binds-read-only-file-reads-to-a-merkle-tree-digest/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A file can be stored on media that is less trusted than the process consuming it. Making that file read-only through ordinary permission bits does not prove that the bytes later returned from storage are the bytes that were approved earlier. Linux &lt;code&gt;fs-verity&lt;/code&gt; addresses that narrower integrity boundary for supported filesystems by binding reads from an enabled file to a Merkle tree and a stable file digest.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The mechanism has two distinct security roles. The kernel verifies file data against the Merkle tree during reads. A separate policy must establish that the resulting fs-verity digest is the digest that the system intended to trust. Treating those roles as one guarantee overstates what the filesystem feature provides.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>fs-verity Binds File Reads to a Merkle Tree Digest</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/fs-verity-binds-file-reads-to-a-merkle-tree-digest/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/fs-verity-binds-file-reads-to-a-merkle-tree-digest/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A package manager can place an executable on a writable filesystem, close it, and later expect every byte returned from that file to match a previously approved object. Ordinary permissions can stop cooperative writers, but they do not turn file contents into a cryptographically identified object. Linux &lt;code&gt;fs-verity&lt;/code&gt; supplies that narrower property for individual files: after verity is enabled, file data becomes read-only and reads are checked against a Merkle tree rooted in a stable file digest.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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