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    <title>Host Keys on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Host Keys on Nalar</description>
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      <title>SSH Host Key Continuity Is a Client Trust Boundary</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/ssh-host-key-continuity-is-a-client-trust-boundary/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;ssh-host-key-continuity-is-a-client-trust-boundary&#34;&gt;SSH Host Key Continuity Is a Client Trust Boundary&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;An SSH connection can negotiate strong encryption and still authenticate the wrong server. Encryption protects the transport after key exchange establishes its cryptographic context; it does not independently tell a client that the server key belongs to the intended host. That identity decision rests on host-key verification.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;For many interactive clients, the visible artifact is a &lt;code&gt;known_hosts&lt;/code&gt; entry. The deeper security property is continuity: a client needs a trustworthy basis for accepting a host key now and for deciding whether a different key later represents legitimate rotation or an unexpected endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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