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    <title>NSEC on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in NSEC on Nalar</description>
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      <title>Aggressive DNSSEC Caching Reuses Authenticated Denial Proofs</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/aggressive-dnssec-caching-reuses-authenticated-denial-proofs/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/aggressive-dnssec-caching-reuses-authenticated-denial-proofs/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A conventional DNS negative cache remembers a negative result for a specific query. DNSSEC adds richer material to that response: NSEC and NSEC3 records can cryptographically prove that names or record types do not exist. RFC 8198 permits a validating resolver to reuse those cached proofs for later queries that fall inside the proven space.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This behavior is called aggressive use of the DNSSEC-validated cache. It can suppress repeated authoritative lookups for names whose nonexistence is already established by validated data. The mechanism is more than a performance optimization: fewer unnecessary queries also reduce exposure of misspelled or random names beyond the recursive resolver and can absorb part of the load created by random-QNAME traffic.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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