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    <title>OpenSSH on Nalar</title>
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      <title>SSH User Certificates Bind CA Trust to Principals</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/ssh-user-certificates-bind-ca-trust-to-principals/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;ssh-user-certificates-bind-ca-trust-to-principals&#34;&gt;SSH User Certificates Bind CA Trust to Principals&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Managing SSH access with individual public keys is straightforward at small scale. Each server can keep a list of accepted keys in &lt;code&gt;authorized_keys&lt;/code&gt;. As the number of people and hosts grows, however, access control also becomes a key-distribution problem: adding, rotating, and removing identities requires changes across the machines that trust them.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;OpenSSH user certificates provide a different trust model. A server can trust a user certification authority (CA), then accept user certificates signed by that CA when the certificate also satisfies the server&amp;rsquo;s authentication policy. The CA signature answers only part of the decision. Principals, validity intervals, certificate options, and server configuration determine where and how the signed key may be used.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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