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    <title>Package Security on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Package Security on Nalar</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 05 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Prevent Dependency Confusion with Explicit Package Sources</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/prevent-dependency-confusion-with-explicit-package-sources/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 05 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/prevent-dependency-confusion-with-explicit-package-sources/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A dependency declaration can look precise and still leave an important security question unanswered: &lt;strong&gt;where is this package allowed to come from?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This matters when an organisation uses both private packages and a public package registry. If a package manager or build configuration can resolve the same package name from more than one source, an attacker may be able to publish a public package that competes with the intended private one. A build that selects the wrong source can then run attacker-controlled package code inside a trusted development or build environment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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