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    <title>Path Traversal on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Path Traversal on Nalar</description>
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      <title>Keep File Access Inside an Intended Directory</title>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Applications often let a caller identify a file: download an invoice, open an exported report, read a template, or retrieve an uploaded document. The dangerous version of this design treats a caller-controlled path as if it were already a permitted file.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A path can describe movement through a filesystem, not just a filename. If untrusted input is combined with an application directory without a reliable containment check, the resulting path may resolve somewhere outside that directory. A read operation can expose configuration or private data; a write or delete operation can have more serious consequences.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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