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    <title>PKI on Nalar</title>
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      <title>Use Certificate Transparency as a Detection Signal</title>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;A TLS certificate can be valid in every cryptographic sense and still be operationally unexpected. A forgotten staging host may receive a certificate through an automated pipeline. A vendor may issue for a delegated subdomain that the central security team did not know existed. More seriously, an attacker who gains control of a DNS validation path or a certificate-authority account may obtain a certificate for a name they should not control.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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