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    <title>Privilege Boundaries on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Privilege Boundaries on Nalar</description>
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      <title>no_new_privs Makes Exec-Time Privilege Gain Irreversible</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/no-new-privs-makes-exec-time-privilege-gain-irreversible/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;no_new_privs-makes-exec-time-privilege-gain-irreversible&#34;&gt;no_new_privs Makes Exec-Time Privilege Gain Irreversible&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A Linux service may deliberately execute programs that carry set-user-ID bits or file capabilities while intending to remain at its existing privilege level. Without an explicit execution boundary, &lt;code&gt;execve()&lt;/code&gt; can be a privilege transition: metadata on the executable may change effective credentials or contribute capabilities to the new program.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The &lt;code&gt;no_new_privs&lt;/code&gt; task attribute changes that transition. Once set, a successful &lt;code&gt;execve()&lt;/code&gt; cannot grant the task privilege that it could not exercise before the call. The attribute is inherited by descendants, survives execution, and cannot be cleared. Those properties make it a one-way constraint on a process lineage rather than a temporary option around one executable.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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