<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Process Isolation on Nalar</title>
    <link>https://nalar.dev/tags/process-isolation/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Process Isolation on Nalar</description>
    <generator>Hugo</generator>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <atom:link href="https://nalar.dev/tags/process-isolation/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>Close-on-Exec Makes Descriptor Inheritance an Explicit Boundary</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/close-on-exec-makes-descriptor-inheritance-an-explicit-boundary/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/close-on-exec-makes-descriptor-inheritance-an-explicit-boundary/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A service opens a privileged socket, starts helper programs, and expects those helpers to receive only standard input, output, and error. One descriptor created without close-on-exec can quietly violate that boundary. If it remains present when a new program image is installed, the helper inherits access to the kernel object even when its own credentials could never have opened that object.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Linux treats this as descriptor inheritance, not a new authorization event. The security decision made when the object was opened is embodied in the descriptor. &lt;code&gt;FD_CLOEXEC&lt;/code&gt; controls whether that established authority crosses a successful &lt;code&gt;execve()&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
