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    <title>Same-Origin Policy on Nalar</title>
    <link>https://nalar.dev/tags/same-origin-policy/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Same-Origin Policy on Nalar</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>DNS Rebinding Turns Name Resolution Into a Moving Network Boundary</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/dns-rebinding-turns-name-resolution-into-a-moving-network-boundary/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/dns-rebinding-turns-name-resolution-into-a-moving-network-boundary/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A browser loads script from an attacker-controlled hostname while that name resolves to a public server. Seconds later, another lookup for the same hostname returns a private address such as an RFC 1918 destination. The browser still sees the same scheme, host, and port in the URL, yet a subsequent connection can terminate at a different machine.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;That gap between web origin identity and network destination is the basis of DNS rebinding. The same-origin policy primarily reasons about origins expressed through URL components; it does not define an origin by the IP address selected by DNS for each connection. An attacker who controls both a hostname and its DNS answers can exploit that separation when a browser is permitted to resolve the name to a target reachable from the user&amp;rsquo;s network.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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