Landlock Rulesets Restrict Future Path Access, Not Open File Authority

Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000

Landlock Rulesets Restrict Future Path Access, Not Open File Authority

A process opens a writable configuration file, installs a restrictive Landlock ruleset, and then continues running code that should have access only to a small working directory. The later policy can block a fresh attempt to open that configuration path, yet the descriptor obtained before confinement remains usable. The filesystem view has narrowed, but authority already materialized as an open file has not vanished.

Seccomp Filters Reduce Syscall Surface Without Forming a Complete Sandbox

Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000

Seccomp Filters Reduce Syscall Surface Without Forming a Complete Sandbox

A service can run with a short seccomp allowlist and still retain broad authority through file descriptors, filesystem permissions, network endpoints, and credentials. The filter may sharply reduce the kernel interfaces reachable through system calls, yet the process can remain capable of damaging actions through operations that are explicitly allowed. This is the central boundary of seccomp: it filters syscall attempts; it does not define the full security policy of a process.

Sandboxing on Nalar

Landlock Rulesets Restrict Future Path Access, Not Open File Authority

Landlock Rulesets Restrict Future Path Access, Not Open File Authority

Seccomp Filters Reduce Syscall Surface Without Forming a Complete Sandbox

Seccomp Filters Reduce Syscall Surface Without Forming a Complete Sandbox