<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Secure Coding on Nalar</title>
    <link>https://nalar.dev/tags/secure-coding/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Secure Coding on Nalar</description>
    <generator>Hugo</generator>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</lastBuildDate>
    <atom:link href="https://nalar.dev/tags/secure-coding/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>Enforce Object-Level Authorization on Every Request</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/enforce-object-level-authorization-on-every-request/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/enforce-object-level-authorization-on-every-request/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;An application can authenticate a user correctly and still expose another user&amp;rsquo;s data. The failure often happens when an endpoint accepts a resource identifier, loads that resource, and assumes that knowing the identifier is enough to use it.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;It is not.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A resource ID answers &lt;strong&gt;which object&lt;/strong&gt; the client wants. Authorization must separately answer &lt;strong&gt;whether this actor may perform this action on that object&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This article develops a practical mental model for object-level authorization, shows where checks belong, and explains how to avoid common gaps when applications grow beyond simple owner-only data.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
