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    <title>Unix Sockets on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Unix Sockets on Nalar</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>SCM_RIGHTS Transfers File-Descriptor Authority Across Unix Sockets</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/scm-rights-transfers-file-descriptor-authority-across-unix-sockets/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;scm_rights-transfers-file-descriptor-authority-across-unix-sockets&#34;&gt;SCM_RIGHTS Transfers File-Descriptor Authority Across Unix Sockets&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A privileged service can open a file that another process could not open by pathname, then pass that access through a Unix-domain socket. The receiving process gets a new file descriptor referring to the same kernel open-file state. No second pathname lookup is required, and the receiver&amp;rsquo;s ability to open that path is not re-evaluated as part of the transfer.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;That property makes &lt;code&gt;SCM_RIGHTS&lt;/code&gt; more than an IPC convenience. It moves an already-established kernel capability across a process boundary. Security therefore depends on both sides of the exchange: the sender must constrain which descriptors can leave its authority domain, and the receiver must treat incoming descriptors as privileged objects whose properties require validation.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Unix Socket Peer Credentials Bind Identity to a Local Connection</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/unix-socket-peer-credentials-bind-identity-to-a-local-connection/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;unix-socket-peer-credentials-bind-identity-to-a-local-connection&#34;&gt;Unix Socket Peer Credentials Bind Identity to a Local Connection&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A privileged local service often accepts requests from processes that share the same host but do not share the same authority. A pathname on a Unix domain socket can control who reaches the listener, yet a successful connection does not by itself tell the service which process is on the other end. Linux provides a second boundary: &lt;code&gt;SO_PEERCRED&lt;/code&gt; lets a connected Unix socket expose peer credentials supplied by the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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