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    <title>WebAuthn on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in WebAuthn on Nalar</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Passkeys Change the Shape of Account Recovery Risk</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/passkeys-change-the-shape-of-account-recovery-risk/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
      <guid>https://nalar.dev/passkeys-change-the-shape-of-account-recovery-risk/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Passkeys can make the primary sign-in path markedly harder to phish while leaving an older recovery path almost untouched. That asymmetry matters. An account protected by a device-bound or synced passkey may still accept a password reset through email, a support-assisted identity check, or a fallback factor with weaker resistance to social engineering.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The result is not a flaw in passkeys. It is an architectural shift: once routine authentication stops depending on a reusable secret, attackers have more incentive to target the mechanisms that restore access after credentials are unavailable. Security teams that evaluate only the sign-in ceremony can miss the route that now carries much of the residual account-takeover risk.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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