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    <title>WebSocket on Nalar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in WebSocket on Nalar</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Validate WebSocket Origins Before Accepting Browser Connections</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/validate-websocket-origins-before-accepting-browser-connections/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;A WebSocket connection can stay open for minutes or hours and carry commands in both directions. If a browser automatically attaches an authenticated session to the opening handshake, a hostile web page may be able to start that connection in the user&amp;rsquo;s browser unless the server checks which site initiated it.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;That creates a cross-site trust problem. The user can be signed in to &lt;code&gt;app.example&lt;/code&gt;, visit another site in a separate tab, and still have the browser make requests that involve credentials associated with &lt;code&gt;app.example&lt;/code&gt;. A WebSocket server that accepts the handshake based only on those credentials can give an untrusted page access to an authenticated channel.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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