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      <title>CSP Strict-Dynamic Shifts Script Trust From Hosts to Execution Lineage</title>
      <link>https://nalar.dev/csp-strict-dynamic-shifts-script-trust-from-hosts-to-execution-lineage/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0700</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;csp-strict-dynamic-shifts-script-trust-from-hosts-to-execution-lineage&#34;&gt;CSP Strict-Dynamic Shifts Script Trust From Hosts to Execution Lineage&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A page can carry a restrictive script host list and still face a difficult deployment choice when its trusted bootstrap code loads dependencies at runtime. Adding every current script host to &lt;code&gt;script-src&lt;/code&gt; keeps policy tied to network locations that can change. Adding &lt;code&gt;&#39;strict-dynamic&#39;&lt;/code&gt; takes a different route: in supporting browsers, trust attached to a nonce-bearing or hash-authorized root script can propagate to scripts that root code inserts dynamically.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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